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In re ROBERT C. MciNTURFF, on Habeas
[1] Delinquent Children-Youth Correction.-Undcr the Youth
Act as it existed in 1943, it was
that

the trial court
who came within
Welf. & Inst.
§ 1731.5, subds. (a)
, to the Youth
for its determination whether it would
commitment of such
and refusal to
them could
be corrected on
[2] Id.- Youth Correction._,_ Trial court's failure to
offender to the Youth Authority at a time
& Inst.
§
required it to do so may be
sense that, if the circumstances are
the writ of prohibition may issue to
action, or the writ of certiorari to
failure of a court to proceed in the manner
not an act in excess of jurisdiction in the
habeas corpus will liP.
[3] Habeas Corpus-Existence of Another Remedy-Appeal.\Vhere
is held under a judgment which has become
and there is no lack of jurisdiction in the strict sense
no constitutional question, and the question sought to
could have been and was not
appeal,
corpus
should not lie.
[4] Delinquent Children-Youth Correction-Habeas Corpus.IIabea;;; corpus
of con-

See 13 Cal.Jur. 218
McK. Dig. References:
Habeas
§ 12.

§ 31
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sacramento
granting a writ of habeas corpus. Raymond
'l'. Coughlin, Judge. Reversed.
Pred N. Howser and Edmund G.
era!, Clarence A. Linn ami Gail A. Strader, Deputy
General, for Appellant.
Oscar A. Kistle, Public Defender (Sacramento) and Thomas
\V. Olson, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for Hespondent.
SCHAUER, ,J.-The superior court, in this habeas corpus
proceeding, determined that petitioner was unlawfully confined in the state prison at Polsom and ordered that he be
discharged. The People appeaL The question is whether the
writ of habeas corpus is available, after final judgment of conYiction and sentence, to review the trial court's erroneous
refusal to certify petitioner to the Youth Authority. We have
concluded that the writ cannot be used for this purpose.
Petitioner is confined under a judgment of conviction of
first degree robbery. At the time of his apprehension for the
offense petitioner was 18 years of age. \Vhen he came before
the trial court for sentence in
1943, that court denied
petitioner's request to be referred to the Youth Authority
and sentenced him to state
for the term prescribed
by law.
'l'he Youth Authority Act as it read at the time petitioner
committed the crime and at the time he was sentenced provided, ''a court shall commit to the Authority any person
convicted of a public offense whom the Authority believes can
be materially benefited by the procedure herein provided for,
and for whose care and maintenance there exists, in the opinion of the Authority, proper and adequate facilities, and who
Is found to be less than 23 years of age at the time of

C.2d
law is
in which the word
of
or certiorari is
under consideration. (See Redlands lL Seh. Dist. v.
, 20 CaL2d
360
P.2d
.) And the
habeas corpus has been
of that
The broadened uses of habeas
corpus
the
situations in which it is available to reYiew matters over which
the trial court had "
' rather than
the
of '
In
Bell (1942), 19
CaL2d
493~494
P.2d
; In 1·e 111cYieket·s (1946),
29 Cal.2d 264, 273 [176 P.2d 40]; In re
(1946), 29
CaL2cl 294, 296 [176 P.2d
.) 'rherefore, no 1Jseful purpose
would be serYed
discussion of whether the error here was
' or ''n1ere.''
[3] Whe1·e, as
the petitioner is held under a judgment which has become final, and there is no lack of jurisdic~
tion in the strict sense and no constitutional question, the following considerations are
to the determination
whether relief by habeas corpus is available : If the question
sought to be presented eould have been and was not presented
by appeal, ordinarilrhabeas corpus should not lie. (See In re
Connor (1940), 16 Cal.2d 701,706 [108 P.2d 10].) Without
this usual limitation of the usc of the writ, judgments of con·dction of crime would haYe only a semblance of finality. But
there are some situations where habeas corpus can be used to
the relief sought without going' behind the judgment of
conviction and without opening up questions of fact which
are difficult of solution. For example, relief can be given to
a person held under S(mtencc to an institution or custodian
other than the one authorized by law (In 1~e Wilson ( 1925),
196 Cal.
525 [238 P, 359]; Pen. Code,
1486, 1487,
snbd.
, 1493, ] 501 , to one upon whom the wrong type of
sentence has been imposed (In re Lee (1918), 177 Cal. 690,
696 [171 P.
[indeterminate sentence imposed when petitioner should have been sentenced to a fixed term; petitioner
remanded for sentence] ) , and to one whose commitment for
punishment as an habitual criminal has been founded upon
facts which as a matter of law do not admit of sueh punishment (In 1'1' Me Vickers (1946) supra, 2H Cal.2d 264, 274;
In 1'C
, supra, 29 Oal.2d 294, 303). Also, and
similarly, the writ may be used to discharge one whose sentence for a term of years JS
than that authorized by

881
law, where the valid
In

Jlfm'ck

In each

, 180 CaL :~84
these instances determinations which were un~
law and which affected
were cor~
where the

!'Onrt at its
dPtermination in the circumstances.
case the unauthorized determination
should
not bt> referred to the Youth Authority) was one which might
or might not have affected punishment. .At this late date we
<~annot presume
discharging petitioner
in
require us to presume) that had petitioner been referred to
the Youth Authority that hody vvould have found that he was
a proper subject for its control and that it had facilities to
accept him, and that the Authority would have discharged
him when or before he reached the age of 25 years. Nor do
we think it proper to require that petitioner be retroactively
certified to the Authority for that body's speculative determination as to what it would have done had petitioner been
referred to it at the proper time. To reopen to speculative
review the cases of prisoners who were not referred to the
Authority during the period when such referral was both
mandatory and possible, whether or not those prisoners are
now of such age that they could be subject to control of the
Authority, would not accord with the general principle of
finality of judgments. For the reasons above stated, In re
Rug land (1947) ,supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 316, 317, is disapproved.
In accord with our position here is the position taken in
the following cases which considered the effect of the trial
eourt 's failure to comply with the
of the Juvenile
Court Law that defendants under a certain age be certified
to the juvenile court for its determination whether they should
be proceeded against as juveniles or tried as adults: In re
'Porn (1911), 17 CaLApp. 678, 680 [121 P. 294]; People v.
Oxnant (1915), 170 CaL 211, 217-218 [149 P. 165]; In re
Northon (1917), 35 Cal.App. 369, 371 [169 P. 1051]; In re
Wolff ( 1920), 183 CaL 602 [192 P.
; People v. Barbera
(1926), 78 Cal.App. 277, 279
P. 304]; In re Downs
(1928), 95 CaLApp. 571, 573 [273 P. 143]; People v. Lttzo~vich (1932), 127 CaLApp. 465, 468 [16 P.2d 144]; People v.
Sanchez (1942), 21 Cal.2d466, 471 [132 P.2d 810]. The cases
of In re rl'assey (1927), 81 CaLApp. 287, 293 [253 P. 948];
In re Bast·iani (1927), 81 Cal.App. 294 [253 P. 951]; and
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